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Abstract  
We examine the evolution and maintenance of defence and conspicuousness in prey species using 
a game theoretic model. In contrast to previous works, predators can raise as well as lower their 
attack probabilities as a consequence of encountering moderately defended prey. Our model 
predicts four distinct possibilities for ESSs featuring maximum crypsis. Namely that such a 
solution can exist with (1) zero toxicity, (2) a non-zero but non-aversive level of toxicity, (3) a 
high, aversive level of toxicity or (4) that no such maximally cryptic solution exists. Maximally 
cryptic prey may still invest in toxins, because of the increased chance of surviving an attack 
(should they be discovered) that comes from having toxins. The toxin load of maximally cryptic 
prey may be sufficiently strong that the predators will find them aversive, and seek to avoid 
similar looking prey in future. However, this aversiveness does not always necessarily trigger 
aposematic signalling, and highly toxic prey can still be maximally cryptic, because the increased 
initial rate of attack from becoming more conspicuous is not necessarily always compensated for 
by increased avoidance of aversive prey by predators. In other circumstances, the optimal toxin 
load may be insufficient to generate aversion but still be non-zero (because it increases survival), 
and in yet other circumstances, it is optimal to make no investment in toxins at all. The model also 
predicts ESSs where the prey are highly defended and aversive and where this defence is 
advertised at a cost of increased conspicuousness to predators. In many circumstances there is an 
infinite array of these aposematic ESSs, where the precise appearance is unimportant as long as it 
is highly visible and shared by all members of the population. Yet another class of solutions is 
possible where there is strong between-individual variation in appearance between conspicuous, 
poorly defended prey.  
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Secondary defences increase the inclusive fitness of a prey animal by increasing the likelihood 
that it escapes from a predator without serious injury and/or by decreasing the probability that the 
same predator will attack the prey and its relatives in the future. Though diverse in form, 
components of secondary defences can be broadly classified into locomotor (rapid escape, protean 
evasive flight), morphological (spines, tough integuments etc.) and chemical (toxins, venoms, 
noxious secretions etc.) classes. In some cases defences may be visually detectable before an 
attack is launched and function as their own reliable signal to predators; the existence of numerous 
sharp spines or the mode of locomotion of an animal may present predators with reliable and 
detectable cues as to the unprofitability of specific prey types.  
 
In many other cases, and especially in examples of chemical defences, the threat posed by 
secondary defences are not easily evaluated by potential predators using external cues in prey; 
here defended prey “require some signal or danger flag which shall serve as a warning to would-
be enemies not to attack them, and they have usually obtained this in the form of conspicuous or 
brilliant coloration, very distinct from the protective tints of the defenceless animals allied to 
them” (p. 232, Wallace, 1889). 
 
Thus many, but not all, prey with effective secondary defences possess danger flags in the form of 
more or less conspicuous (“aposematic”) warning displays that help predators distinguish edible 
from unprofitable and dangerous species.  
 
Given that defended prey can vary their degree of conspicuousness, a pertinent question is how 
conspicuous (or how cryptic) should a particular prey be? Conspicuousness is, in many prey, 
directly traded-off against crypsis, such that the benefits that accrue from conspicuousness 
(reduced recognition errors, enhanced wariness, accelerated learning and decelerated forgetting 
processes in predators) are gained at the expense of increased rates of detection by predators. 
Should we expect optimal conspicuousness to increase continuously with the strength of a prey 
animal’s defence, as has recently been suggested (Summers & Clough, 2001), or can we expect a 
more complex relationship between defence and conspicuousness? A second, related and 
important question is; whether (and when) should defended prey show between-individual 
variation in their appearance.   
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Defences themselves may be costly and therefore be traded-off against other components of 
fitness. There is a growing body of empirical literature that demonstrates that many chemical 
defences incur fitness costs, either through the costs of biosynthesis or acquisition (via 
sequestration or symbiosis) and storage. Such costs are often seen in reductions in growth, in adult 
size, in fecundity or have been directly measured in energetic terms (Cohen, 1985; Zalucki et al., 
2001; Bowers & Collinge, 1992; Camara, 1997; Bjorkman & Larsson, 1991; Rowell-Rahier & 
Pasteels, 1986; Dobler & Rowell-Rahier, 1994; Grill & Moore, 1998), although we note that in 
some circumstances costs have not been detected (Bowers, 1988; Kearsley & Whitham, 1992). 
Another pertinent question is therefore “how much should any given prey invest in its defences?” 
 
To date the co-evolution and optimisation of constitutive defences in prey animals and signals of 
those defences have received surprisingly little theoretical attention. The model of Leimar et al. 
(1986) is, however, particularly important. This model includes: (1) components of an individual 
predator’s psychology and behaviour (varied learning rates and sensory generalisation in order to 
calculate attack probabilities); (2) the properties of individual prey (continuous variation in 
effectiveness of unprofitability in terms of individual survival and effects on predators’ learning 
rates, costs of a defence, and degree of conspicuousness) and (3) structuring of prey populations 
(size and degree of clustering of prey as a proxy for kin selection). Leimar et al. combine these 
components into a model that determined evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) for the 
continuously-varying parameters of conspicuousness and unprofitability. Their model predicts that 
there can be a single monotypic ESS for some nontrivial level of defence for a prey of given 
conspicuousness. Increases in optimal levels of defence would be caused by: (i) increases in 
survival rates of individuals combined with (ii) a positive relationship between learning rate and 
prey unprofitability provided that there was a capacity for predators to confer the benefit of 
avoidance learning on the same individuals (through repeated attacks) or through kin grouping.  
 
Furthermore, Leimar et al. (1986) found that kin grouping, perhaps combined with an increase in 
predation threat, could destabilise crypsis in favour of aposematism, but that, once evolved, kin 
grouping was not necessary for the maintenance of aposematism. When aposematism already 
exists, it could be stabilised by (i) a positive relationship between conspicuousness and learning 
and (ii) a supernormal (or peak-shift-like) response, in which the strongest levels of avoidance are 
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conferred on phenotypes that are more conspicuous than those generally encountered. The game 
theoretic approach developed by Leimar et al. represents a seminal work in the theory of prey 
defences and warning signals, providing a framework in which the evolution of both traits can be 
analysed. However we note a number of areas that in our view warrant further attention and 
development.  
 
The model of Leimar et al. (1986) considers a set of naïve predators (initially one individual) that 
start out with an initial “excitatory” attack tendency described as e(x), its generalisation gradient 
due to the “predator’s experience of cryptic and profitable prey of other species”. When these 
naïve predators now meet unprofitable prey, generalised attack probabilities are reduced according 
to an inhibitory gradient h(x,x1,y1) , where x1 is the conspicuousness and y1 the unprofitability of 
the encountered prey individual. Hence, in this model, attack probabilities for a range of prey 
appearances are determined by a generalisation function of the form 
 
G(x) = e(x)[1- h(x,x1,y1)]n where n is the number of previous encounters between predator and 
prey.  
 
Since the model of Leimar et al. (1986) was constructed to explicitly examine the effects of 
individual predator psychology on aposematic evolution, this formulation is entirely reasonable. 
However, the implication of this component of the model is that the predator can reduce its range 
of generalised attack probabilities, because of repeated inhibitory effects, but it cannot ever raise 
it. Whichever prey gets attacked, whatever their appearance and toxicity, whatever the outcome, 
the aversion of the predator increases for every further prey individual encountered, or at least 
cannot decrease. However, this is clearly not an appropriate long-term strategy for a predator, as it 
must necessarily lead to ever decreasing uptake rates.  In addition, we argue in this paper that the 
generality of the results described in Leimar et al. (1986) can in some cases be hard to evaluate, as 
they select specific functional forms at the outset. A more general model of predation may provide 
a more flexible framework for evaluation.  
 
In this paper we therefore examine the evolution of conspicuousness and defence in defended 
species with a complementary model to that of Leimar et al. (1986). We assume that the secondary 
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defence is a form of toxicity (though it can clearly be extended beyond this) and present a model 
that we strive to make as general as possible whilst still being capable of making useful specific 
predictions. Thus, rather than describe the effects of learning in individual predators, a set of 
predators is modelled here as a group in equilibrium for states of learning, hunger etc.   
 
Furthermore, in the model described here, predators can both lower and raise their attack 
probabilities with prey that contain modest quantities of toxins (Sherratt et al., 2004).  We use the 
model to investigate (1) the relationship between defence and the appearance of a prey when the 
levels of mortality from causes other than predation and the degree of kin grouping varies; (2) the 
optimal level of conspicuousness for a range of toxicity levels; and (3) the extent to which optimal 
toxicity can be affected by the appearance of an animal and the degree of kin grouping within the 
population.  
 
Model Description 
We consider a single population of individuals that are potentially prey to a predator. Each prey 
individual i is described by three parameters {ti, ri, θi}. The parameter ti describes the toxicity (or, 
more generally, investment in anti-predatory defence) of individual i, with increasing values 
indicating increasing toxicity, and ti = 0 indicating minimal investment in toxicity. The parameter 
ri describes the conspicuousness of individual i (or more generally the probability of detection 
upon encounter with a predator is an increasing function of ri). Increasing values of ri indicate 
increasing conspicuousness, with r = 0 indicating maximum crypsis. The final parameter θi also 
describes the appearance of the individual, but such that changes in θ affect the appearance of the 
individual without affecting its conspicuousness. Thus two prey types can be equal in 
conspicuousness against the background (have identical r values) but be very different in 
appearance from each other (have different θ values). For example two brightly coloured butterfly 
species can be equally easy to detect against the background foliage but can still be identified as 
distinct species. . Thus r and θ are orthogonal axes that together describe the parameter space of 
possible appearance. Without loss of generality, we assume that these axes are polar rather than 
Cartesian, θ  taking values in (0,2pi). We are interested in finding the evolutionary stable values of 
{ti, ri, θi}.  
 
 7 
A key assumption of the model is that toxin production is expensive. We describe this by 
assuming that the fecundity of an individual F is a decreasing function of ti. However, there is also 
a direct benefit to toxicity in that increasing investment in toxicity increases the likelihood of 
surviving a predatory attack. Specifically, we assume that if the predator attacks a prey item then 
the probability that the prey is captured (K) is a declining function of t.  
 
There is another way that toxicity can affect survivorship and this is by influencing the probability 
that upon encountering an individual prey item, the predator decides to attack that particular prey 
individual. This probability (denoted by Q) declines with the aversiveness of the experiences that 
the predator is likely to have previously had (and subsequently remembered) on attacking similar 
looking prey items. Let us consider a predator attacking individual i. We first of all need to define 
“similar looking” individuals to individual i. We do this with a function S(ri,θi, rj, θj), which is a 
measure of the visual similarity between individuals i and j.  S increases as the points { ri,θi} and 
{rj,θj} get closer together; in particular in this paper we treat S as a univariate function of the 
Euclidian distance between the two species (see Appendix 1). We also have to describe the 
aversiveness of an experience with a prey item, which we do with function H. Specifically H(tj) is 
the aversiveness of attacking individual j. Positive values of H indicate an aversive experience; the 
higher the toxicity, the more positive H is and so the more aversive the experience. However, if an 
individual’s investment in toxins is low then the experience of attacking it may not be aversive at 
all, indeed the predator may treat it as a beneficial experience. We describe such situations by a 
negative value of H. We define the critical value of toxicity (tc) as that which produces a neutrally 
aversive response: 
 
( ) 0=ctH          (1) 
 
This non-zero value of tc represents the phenomenon that prey may have to invest non-trivially in 
defence to become sufficiently aversive as to be unattractive to predator. That is, predators may be 
prepared to still consume prey with some mild aversive features, because the rewards of 
nutritional content are worth this small cost. We also need to describe encounter rates between the 
predator and prey, and the ease with which they are subsequently remembered. We assume that 
the probability that an individual of conspicuousness r is detected by a predator when it encounters 
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it is D, where D is an increasing function of r but even maximally cryptic prey have some chance 
of being detected (i.e. when r=0, D(r)>0). The rate at which such encounters occur and are later 
recalled by the predator is L, where L too is an increasing function of r. If the predator has perfect 
recollection of all encounters then L = D. Drawing all this together, on encountering individual i, 
then the available information to the predators (scaled by the total number of predators) on the 
attractiveness or aversiveness of that prey item (denoted Ii)  can be calculated as follows 
 
( ) ( ) ( )jjiijN
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=       (2) 
 
where N is the number of prey items in the population and n is the number of predators. We shall 
take this as our measure of the information that an average predator has about individual i. When 
this individual meets a predator, we assume that it is equally likely to be any of the n available, so 
that the predator will on average have this information about its aversiveness. It shall be further 
assumed that the population is in equilibrium, and its size is sufficiently large, so that any 
individual encounter has no effect on the population size. We assume that on encountering 
individual i, the probability of the predator mounting an attack is Q(Ii) and Q declines with 
increasing Ii.  
  
We must now describe the fitness of individual i. We assume that there is a background mortality 
rate λ. From our arguments above, the rate of predator-induced mortality on this individual, 
assuming without loss of generality that any prey individual encounters a predator at unit rate, is 
D(ri)K(ti)Q(Ii), and so the fitness of individual i can be described by  
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It is this fitness function that we use in our ESS calculations, where we consider inclusive fitness 
assuming that the average relatedness between individuals is a. Note, since we are only interested 
in situations where the population is at equilibrium, this fitness description is equivalent to the 
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alternative per capita rate of increase. Our ESS calculations are outlined in Appendix 1, and the 
key results presented in the next section. It should be noted at this point that a strategy which can 
be attained through small, selectively advantageous steps is called convergence stable. We only 
demonstrate when strategies in our model are resistant to such changes, and do not show that 
strategies are convergence stable.  
 
Results  
We explore the different types of ESS possible in our model in this section. We break this down 
by considering the different types of conspicuousness (r1) in turn. For each such appearance there 
is an optimal level of toxicity (t1) given by the function 
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provided that this yields a non-zero toxicity, where the information of toxicity is given by  
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since N is large. 
 
i) ESS featuring maximal crypsis (i.e. r = 0)  
Appendix 1 demonstrates that there will be an ESS with r = 0, if and only if we satisfy the 
condition: 
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where we represent the average relatedness of individuals in the “local” area by a, 
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= , and t1 is the ESS level of toxicity, which is found by 
substituting r1 =0 in equation (3).                        
 
Note that it is also possible for 1t =0 to be stable, which occurs if  
 
0)0,0(1 <g                                          (6) 
 
This set of equations can only be solved iteratively once specific functional forms for all the 
functions and all parameter values have been specified. But the results in Appendix 1 do allow us 
to draw general conclusions about the type of maximally cryptic ESSs that are possible. 
Specifically, there is an ESS with maximum crypsis and minimal investment in toxins (i.e.  r = 0, t 
= 0 ) provided that inequalities (5) and (6) are satisfied.  
 
However, it is also possible for the ESS to involve significant investment in toxins without this 
triggering a change from maximally cryptic appearance. That is, there is an ESS with (r1 = 0 and t1 
> 0), if equation (3) and inequality (5) are satisfied. 
 
 
ii) ESS with warning colouration (i.e. r > 0),  
One result from Appendix 1 is that individuals will never give up on maximal crypsis unless there 
is investment in toxins. That is, there is never an ESS with r1 > 0 and t1 = 0. In fact, there is no ESS 
with r1 > 0, unless the associated toxin investment is sufficiently strong to be aversive (i.e. t1 > tc). 
However an ESS with r1 > 0 can exist providing that equation (3) is satisfied, together with 
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However, an interesting aspect to this case, is that we demonstrate in Appendix 1 that when an 
ESS with warning colouration is possible, then there is no unique ESS, indeed, there is an infinite 
number of ESSs. Specifically, under reasonable conditions on the parameters, there will be a lower 
critical value of r (denoted R), and all values r > R, have a unique value of t such that {r,t(r)} is an 
ESS. This critical value of R is given by  
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The value of t(r) (obtained from equation (3)) always increases with increasing r, and so we 
predict a strong correlation between investment in toxicity and conspicuousness of aposematic 
signals.  
 
iii) ESSs where there is heterogeneity in appearance between individuals.  
For the ESSs that have been discussed so far, the value of θ has been irrelevant. For maximally 
cryptic solutions with r = 0, it is easy to see that there is no selection pressure on the value of θ. 
For the ESSs with aversive prey (t1 > tc) and warning colouration (r > 0), it is clear there is now 
strong selection pressure on θ, but this selection pressure drives the population towards 
homogeneity in this parameter, the final parameter value settled upon is irrelevant providing all 
individuals adopt the same value (i.e. all individuals look alike).  
 
However, in Appendix 1 we demonstrate that there are situations where the prey contains no 
toxins or some moderate level of toxin but is not aversive in the sense that predators increase their 
willingness to attack similar looking prey in future (t1 < tc) where the solution is more 
complicated. Here, the evolutionarily stable appearance is not full crypsis (i.e. r1 > 0). This is due 
to the fact that looking very similar to other non-toxic cryptic individuals outweighs the benefit of 
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the extra crypsis. Some “aposematic distinctiveness” (in the sense of A.R. Wallace’s original 
formulation) from more edible prey types is therefore optimal, even though the prey is not outright 
aversive. Such a solution will only occur when a small decrease in crypsis (a small increase in r) 
does not cause a large increase in encounter rate (D(r)). 
 
Discussion 
 
We first consider the general classes of possible ESS solution and subsequently consider how 
variation in the value of key variables determines which solution(s) is most likely. Finally we 
compare the model described in this paper with the original model in Leimar et al. (1986). 
 
Evolutionary stable outcomes 
 
Our model predicts four distinct possibilities for a solution with maximum crypsis (r=0). Namely 
that (1) such a solution exists with zero toxicity (t=0), (2) it exists with a non-zero but non-
aversive level of toxicity (0<t<tc), (3) it exists with a high, aversive level of toxicity (t>tc) or (4) 
that no such maximally cryptic solution exists. That is, under some, but not all circumstances, an 
ESS involving the prey all minimising the rate at which they are detected by predators occurs. 
Interestingly, maximally cryptic prey may still invest in toxins, because of the increased chance of 
surviving an attack that comes from having toxins. The toxin load of maximally cryptic prey may 
be sufficiently strong that the predators will find them aversive, and seek to avoid similar looking 
prey in future. However, this aversiveness does not necessarily trigger aposematic signalling, and 
highly toxic prey can still be maximally cryptic, because the increase in rate of attack from 
becoming more conspicuous is not necessarily always compensated for by increased avoidance of 
aversive prey by predators. In other circumstances, the optimal toxin load may be insufficient to 
generate aversion but still be non-zero (because it increases survival), and in yet other 
circumstances, it is optimal to make no investment in toxins at all.  
 
Each of these four possibilities may (for some combinations of parameter values) exist as the only 
ESS (which we label as situation a). However there are also combinations of parameter values 
where each type of maximally cryptic ESS exists alongside a range of non-cryptic ESSs, which 
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involve aversive levels of toxins (we label such situations b).   Any such non-cryptic solution is 
more stable the larger the information of the toxicity of that appearance (thus conditions are often 
given in terms of 1I  is greater than some value). Under reasonable conditions the solution pair 
r,t(r) are stable for values of r above a given threshold R, so that multiple (infinite) solutions exist 
in many circumstances. Effectively, if an animal is conspicuous enough to be easily seen and this 
indicates high toxicity so that predators avoid it, it does not matter exactly which level of 
conspicuousness the prey individuals choose as long as everyone looks the same.  
Any animal that changes its appearance will suffer, so all levels of conspicuousness above a 
certain threshold are stable.  
 
Higher levels of conspicuousness are generally associated with higher levels of toxicity. Thus 
there are eight distinct scenarios (1-4,a-b), between each of which we can specify (admittedly 
complex) boundary conditions in terms of the values given to parameter values.  
 
Note that it is possible that there is no solution either with r=0 or r>0, where all individuals are 
identical in toxicity and appearance. In this case, the solution will have the population of prey 
individuals uniformly spread across all θ values. They need not all have identical r values, and in 
general will not. Generally we expect a critical maximum value of r, below which all prey select 
values. Again increasing r will be associated with increasing (or at least non-decreasing) toxicity. 
Such non-point solutions occur when prey seek to be different from others, to disrupt associative 
learning. In our model increased between-individual separation in appearance is associated with 
increased conspicuousness (and so increased attack rates). It is this trade-off between minimising 
attack rates and maximising visual difference from other prey that generates this heterogeneous-
appearance ESS.  
 
Key parameters and the nature of the ESS  
 
Rather than solve our equations for specific cases of functional responses and parameter values, 
we can make general statements about the influence of our various parameters on which solutions 
are likely to occur. For any particular value of r there is a unique optimal value of toxicity t. In 
general for r>0 the higher t is in conjunction with r, the more likely it is to be stable against 
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changes in appearance (higher t means higher 1I , see (4) and (5)). Increasing the level of deaths 
from other causes λ reduces the value of t for a given r, and so reduces the likelihood of the 
solution being stable, and reduces the stable range of non-cryptic solutions. This makes sense 
since, as the influence of predation declines, the value of deterrence declines relative to the 
decreased fecundity of higher toxicity. Increasing the level of relatedness a increases the toxicity 
level that is optimal for any given r, and makes that solution more likely to be stable. In general 
increasing relatedness increases the range of non-cryptic stable solutions. The higher the 
relatedness, the closer the individual best strategy is to the group optimum, which tends to be 
higher toxicity and conspicuousness. The strategy is less liable to cheating (copying appearance 
with less toxicity), since, if you cheat, you harm your relatives whilst helping yourself.  
 
If we substitute some plausible functional forms for the general functions used in the model, then 
we gain some further insights. Specifically Appendix 2 demonstrates that high toxicity tends to 
occur when the population of prey is large, the relatedness in the population is large, detection 
probability is large (even when maximally cryptic), learning occurs quickly, fecundity declines 
slowly with toxicity, the probability of attack declines quickly with information of toxicity and the 
level of toxicity needed to be aversive is large.  
 
Note that when death can only occur through predation (i.e. λ = 0) and relatedness has no effect (a 
= 0), there is an optimal toxicity independent of appearance. This can be explained by the fact that 
each individual just finds its best level (any population using some trade-off between toxicity and 
appearance is invaded by an individual with identical appearance and optimal toxicity). When 
other mortality factors and/or relatedness feature, then there is an optimal level of toxicity for any 
appearance. 
 
The present model compared to that of Leimar et al. (1986) 
 
The key difference between the model of Leimar et al. and ours is the assumptions about the 
predator population. In their model, there are essentially a group of new predators emerging at the 
start of a season and then continuing to learn over time, so that learning causes changes in the 
predation pressure over time. This is, in our view, eminently reasonable in a study that aims to 
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examine the initial origins of aposematism, in which all predators were initially naïve. Here, by 
contrast, we consider an equilibrium situation, where there is no change in predation pressure over 
time. The equilibrium level may have been reached by learning, or genetic inheritance or a 
combination of the two. However the equilibrium is maintained essentially because there is always 
a balanced mix of young and old individuals in overlapping generations. After the initial evolution 
of aposematism, the Leimar et al. model might thus correspond ecologically to seasonal predators 
such as wasps, and ours to more long-lived predators, such as birds and lizards. 
 
Note that in Leimar et al’s model solution (2) – where there is non-zero investment in toxins but 
not sufficient to cause aversion -  is not possible as (in their model) all non-zero t are aversive, and 
learning can never make a predator more likely to eat something, so as time goes on all prey 
individuals are in less and less danger. Leimar et al’s solutions can include a maximally cryptic 
ESS with either no investment in defences (solution 1) or with defences sufficient to cause 
aversion (solution 3) with a single ESS r>0, as opposed to the range of solutions r>R that we 
generate.  
 
It should be noted that Leimar’s solutions are not true co-evolutionary ESSs, in the sense that they 
fix one parameter (e.g. t) and then find the optimal solution with the other. If we did this, our 
model would also yield (at most) one stable solution r>0. Conversely if both of their parameters 
were allowed to vary simultaneously it is possible that solutions similar to ours would be 
generated. Indeed it seems logical that a range of r values would be stable. The non-cryptic 
solutions rely on predators recognising the prey and avoiding them. Thus any appearance that is 
sufficiently visible may suffice, as long as all individuals of the species look the same. 
 
Leimar et al’s model always yields at least one point solution (i.e. where all individuals have 
identical appearance). Ours yields no point solution under some circumstances. In this case the 
benefits of crypsis are outweighed by the similarity of appearance to other edible forms, and a 
spread of appearances to dilute the information the predator receives about the attractiveness of 
this type of prey is optimal.  
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One of Leimar et al’s key predictions was that a non-cryptic ESS could only occur if predators are 
reluctant to attack prey that are more conspicuous than those so far encountered, or that faster 
learning occurred with the more conspicuous individuals. This is not necessary in our model, 
which has ESSs where there is no greater tendency to avoid the more conspicuous individuals, 
unless there is evidence that they are toxic; indeed the precise mechanisms of learning are not 
central to our model as they are to Leimar et al’s (although they indirectly affect it through the 
functions H(t) and L(r) , as explained above). Leimar concludes that an increased level of survival 
of attacks with t>0 is important to allow ESSs featuring non-zero investment in defence to exist, 
and we are in full agreement with this conclusion. 
  
Conclusions 
 
There has been recent speculation (Summers & Clough, 2001), that there may be a positive 
relationship between the conspicuousness of aposematic signals and the strength of the defence 
that they advertise. Here we present the first explicit mathematical model that can explore this 
suggestion, and our model predictions support this conjecture.   
 
Our model makes the novel prediction that if conditions support the evolution of a sufficiently 
strong defence that the prey are aversive and advertise  that defence in a conspicuous appearance, 
then a broad range of alternate ESSs are possible. The specific ESS reached depends on the history 
of a particular local prey population. Hence, the model suggests that the great diversity of levels of 
defence and appearance of aposematic prey does not necessarily require special explanation but is 
an emergent consequence of the co-evolution of defence and signal of that defence.  
 
The theoretical literature in relation to secondary defences is currently unclear about whether or 
how much we can expect cryptic prey to be defended. Leimar et al. (1986) and also Speed & 
Ruxton (2004) both suggest that when the threat from predators is small cryptic prey should not 
invest in secondary defences. However, many other authors assume that cryptic prey can in fact be 
highly defended (e.g. Harvey et al., 1982; Yachi & Higashi, 1998; Servedio, 2000; Speed, 2001; 
Brodie & Agrawal, 2001). In this work, we predict that in some cases (with high costs and/ or low 
predation risk) maximally cryptic prey will be undefended. In other cases such as when there is a 
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higher risk of predation they will be defended but only moderately: sufficiently to enhance 
individual survival but not sufficiently to make them aversive to predators. In still other cases prey 
will be sufficiently defended to be aversive, but still choose not to signal this if the costs of 
conspicuousness are too great. One important consequence is that aposematic coloration is not 
necessarily the optimal state for prey that posess substantial defences. Our model also makes the 
novel prediction of a stable prey strategy that involves very high levels of variability in appearance 
in prey, combined with moderate and variable levels of defence. At present expectation in many 
theoretical models is that pro-apostatic selection favours diversity in edible, undefended prey 
populations but that as soon as there is any level of defence selection becomes anti-apostatic, 
favouring uniformity (Mallet & Joron, 1999). However we indicate here that one class of stable 
evolutionary result is a combination of some moderate investment in secondary defence with high 
levels of diversity in the prey appearance.  
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Appendix 1: Derivation of ESS solutions   
Let us assume that we have a single species, in which (almost) all individuals possess the 
parameters 111 ,, θrt . Let us consider a small group with alternative parameters  t,r,θ. 111 ,, θrt  is an 
ESS if and only if the reward to a 111 ,, θrt .-individual in such a population is greater than the 
reward to a t,r,θ-individual, for any possible set of alternative parameters t,r,θ. We shall consider 
local ESSs only, where it is assumed that alternative strategies are mutations which are very close 
to the original values.  
 
Relative payoffs  
We represent the average relatedness of individuals in the “local” area by a. We assume that the 
population in this area consists of a proportion of identical individuals a which plays the 
alternative strategy t,r,θ, the remaining members of the population being unrelated to this group 
and playing 111 ,, θrt . The payoff to an individual playing a mutant strategy is given by  
 
)()()(
)(),,;,,( 111 IQtKrD
tF
rtrtP
+
= λθθ                               (12) 
                   
where 
)},,,,()()()1(),,,()()({ 1111 θθθθ rrStHrLarrStHraL
n
NI −+=       
))cos(2(),,,( 1122111 θθθθ −−+= rrrrSrrS                                      
and S(0)=1. 
The payoff to a resident (averaged over a much larger area) is 
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n
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I  is the toxicity information for the mutant in the local area, and 1I  is the toxicity information for 
the resident over the larger area (essentially unaffected by the mutant). To obtain the inclusive 
fitness for both mutant and resident the payoffs should be multiplied by the term (1+a(N-1)); we 
leave this term out as it has no effect on our results.  
 
Optimal toxicity 
 
The ESS value of t can be found by solving the following equation at 111 ,, θθ === rrtt . 
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Note that it is also possible for 1t =0 to be stable, which occurs if  
 
0)0,( 11 <rg                                    (13b) 
 
For the sake of simplicity we shall assume that there is precisely one value of 1t  which satisfies 
these conditions (a reasonable assumption for well behaved functional forms). If there is only one 
such solution, then if this solution involves 01 >t  the solution must be stable. If this were not so, 
the fitness function for t just above 1t  will be higher than that for 1t , but as the fitness must 
eventually decline for very high t, there will be a higher root of (13a).   In fact we show below that 
whenever 1I >0 (t> ct ), the (unique) optimal value of t increases as r increases, so if optimal 
toxicity is aversive for any value of 1r , it is for all larger values of r, under reasonable 
assumptions. 
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),( 111 trg  is increasing with 1r  provided that 1I >0, )(/)()( / iQiiQiV −=  is increasing with positive 
i at the critical value 1r  and )()( 11 IQrD increases with 1r .  
Increasing conspicuousness (r1) will certainly increase the rate at which prey are detected by 
predators (D). However, increasing r1 will increase I1 which in turn will decrease the probability 
that that detection leads to attack (Q). So the rate of attack (the product DQ) could in principle 
increase, decrease, or in the limiting case stay the same as conspicuousness (r1) increases. Indeed 
it would be possible to pick functional forms to achieve all these possible effects. However we 
consider that for the overwhelming majority of biologically plausible formulations D will increase 
faster with r1 than Q decreases, and so the production DQ will increase with increasing r1. Our 
arguments are as follows. As the prey becomes more conspicuous (r1 increases) then the range of 
distances over which it can be detected will increase. Since almost all prey live in habitats where 
predator-prey interactions occur in two or three dimensions, a small increase in detection distance 
can lead to a large increase in encounter rate (D), because of the geometric effect. Although 
increasing conspicuousness will reduce the likelihood of an encounter leading to an attack, this 
probability will not be affected by geometry in the same way, so we would not expect this 
probability (Q) to decrease quickly enough with increasing r to compensate for the dramatic 
increase in D with increasing conspicuousness. Further, we would expect Q to be a more or less 
rapidly saturating function of conspicuousness r1 so that its influence over prey protection is 
generally much more limited than the effects of r1 on detection rates. In models of classical 
conditioning, for example, avoidance learning rates are often described as the product of 
conspicuousness and unpalatability, suggesting rapid saturation, esp. when prey are not very 
highly defended (see e.g. Servedio 2000; Speed 2001). Furthermore an additional mechanism that 
causes the predator to attack conspicuous defended prey is confusing them with other prey types 
that are defended and cryptic, once conspicuous has increased sufficiently that such confusion is 
unlikely, further increases in conspicuousness will have little effect on Q. In contrast, there is less 
reason to expect a similar saturating effect whereby increasing conspicuousness does not lead to 
increased encounter rates except for large values of r (remembering that we only assume DQ to be 
increasing at r1 ) without imposing special assumptions of the habitat structure of animal 
movement, so again, from this reason our expectation is that the product DQ will increase with 
increasing conspicuousness (increasing r1).  
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It should be noted here that these conditions are sufficient, but not necessary, so for instance if V(i) 
is increasing rapidly, then  )()( 11 IQrD  could be decreasing (as long as this is not too quickly) with 
the same result. In fact there is a link between these two assumptions. If L(r)=K D(r) for some 
constant K (reasonable given the relationship between these two functions) then )()( 11 IQrD  
increasing is the same result as V( 1I )<1.  We shall assume that these results are true. Similarly 
at 0),( 111 =trg , the function decreases with t under our assumption of a unique solution, since 
there is either a unique solution with 01 =t and 0)0,( 11 <rg or 0)0,( 11 >rg and there is a unique 
solution with 0),( 111 =trg . 
Thus there is a unique solution for 1t for every 1r , which is increasing with 1r .   
 
So any solution must include this optimal level of toxicity. We next proceed to find the values of 
1r  and 1θ  which can be stable in conjunction with this. Note that in the special case where λ=a=0, 
the optimal level of toxicity is independent of appearance (but not of aversiveness, as it affects this 
through H(t)). It may seem strange that optimal toxicity can be independent of appearance. 
However, natural selection acts at the level of the individual, and a stable solution is one that 
cannot be beaten by an invader. Any situation where the population does not choose the level of 
toxicity dictated by the trade-off between F and K, e.g. to be more toxic to deter predation, will be 
invaded by individuals which have the same appearance but choose the trade-off level. In the case 
where λ is non-zero (but a=0), there is a link between optimal t and appearance, for the sole 
reason that appearance affects the relative contribution of predation and other factors to mortality 
(given by λ/)()()( 111 tKIQrD ). There is thus a unique value of 1t  which is the optimal toxicity 
level for any given 1r . We have to find which value(s) of 1r , if any, give ESSs.  
 
The maximum crypsis solution (r1=0)  
 
Firstly we look at the possibility of a solution with 1r =0 (note that this automatically means that 
the value of 1θ  is irrelevant). We only need to consider invasion by larger values of r, i.e. show 
that  
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The second term is positive for some functions L(r) and S(y) (and for sufficiently small a) if and 
only if H( 1t )>0. In this case 1r  =0 is clearly stable.  
 
This means that for some functional forms being completely cryptic is always an ESS providing 
the best value of t is sufficiently toxic to be aversive, in the sense of reducing attacks by predators.  
 
Other point solutions (r1>0)  
 
If 01 >r  then the value of 1θ  is relevant, and we have to consider invasion by both larger and 
smaller values of r and different values of θ. Considering 1θθ =  initially, we are interested in the 
derivative  
),,;,,( 11111 θθ rtrtP
r∂
∂
 
which is discontinuous at 1rr = due to the similarity function S. The derivative becomes 
|)(|),(),(),,;,,( 111311211111 rr
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∂
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For a stable solution we need this derivative to be positive for 1rr < and negative for 1rr > . This is 
equivalent to 
0),(),( 113112 <− trgtrg                                                        (15a) 
0),(),( 113112 >+ trgtrg                                                         (15b) 
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Note that the discontinuity in the derivative at 1r  means that there is not a unique equilibrium 
value and the conspicuousness level 1r  is stable provided that (15) is satisfied. Equation (15a) is 
more difficult to satisfy than (15b) (unless a is unrealistically large). It is easy to see that it is 
impossible to satisfy this for H( 1t )<0 ( 1I  <0). If H( 1t )>0 then we require  
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Allowing 1θθ ≠  does not impose any further restrictions (invasion by such a strategy is easier to 
resist whenever H( 1t )>0). Any solution satisfying conditions (13) and (16) is thus stable. 
 
On the (reasonable) assumption that )(/)(/ rDrD is decreasing, then if either L(r)=K D(r) for 
some constant K or a is small, 111 ,, θrt  is a local ESS if R < 1r < ∞ for some critical value R (in 
addition to the possible crypsis 01 =r  solution). This is a sufficient condition only; this result may 
occur even if the above is not satisfied. (Similarly, the result may hold even if )()( 11 IQrD does not 
increase with 1r , and because of the discontinuity in the derivative of the fitness function with 
respect to r, the local ESSs are likely to occur for values of 1r  lying in an interval).  This value of 
R may be infinite, which would mean that no solution with 01 >r  exists. 
 
To see this, consider the following. The criterion (16) reduces to 
 






−−−> )(
)()1)(0()(
)()(
1
1
/
/
1
1
/
1
rL
rL
aaS
rD
rD
IV  
 
where the right-hand side of the above is positive. Given that optimal 1t does not decrease with 1r , 
then 1I increases with it so that the left-hand side of the above increases whilst the right-hand side 
decreases. Thus the critical value R is given by 
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Solution summary 
 
t=0 and r=0 when 0)0,0(1 <g , 0)0,0()0,0( 32 >+ gg  
 
t>0 and r=0 when 0),0( 11 =tg , 0),0(),0( 1312 >+ tgtg  
t=0 and r>0 can never occur 
t>0 and r>0 when 0),( 111 =trg  ( ctt >1  also needed), 
0),(),( 113112 <− trgtrg  
 
 
 
A unique ESS, multiple ESSs or no ESSs?  
 
We have an infinite set of candidate solutions given by the pair (r,t(r)), for all positive r, where 
t(r) is obtained from condition (13) and is non-decreasing with r, as soon as t(r) reaches ct  (recall 
that ct  is the value for which H( ct )= 1I =0). 
 
If t(r)< ct  for all values of r, then we know that all of these solutions are unstable, except possibly 
when r=0. This occurs if the optimal value of t in the limit as r tends to infinity is not greater 
than ct , i.e. 
 
0),(1 <∞ ctg  
 
so that 
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if (18) is true then t(0)< ct  and so for 1r =0 we have 1I <0. Thus there is a unique ESS at 1r =0 if 
(14) and (18) hold, otherwise no ESSs if (18) but not (14) holds. 
 
If (18) does not hold, there will be multiple solutions with 1r >0, as well as a solution with 1r =0 if 
and only if (14) holds. 
 
 
Non-point solutions 
 
It is possible to have a solution where not all of the population look alike. In particular there are 
sets of functions where no point solution is possible. Since, for sufficiently small a, 1r =0 is always 
a solution when H( 1t )>0 we shall briefly consider the situation where H( 1t )<0. In this case each 
individual gives information of the non-toxicity of those that it resembles, so that it is best to look 
as little like the other species members as possible. For any given value of 1r , it is clear that the 
best distribution over θ is a uniform one on (0,2pi). 
 
If a population follows this distribution of θ, then 
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In fact such a solution is unlikely to be stable, since it would be invaded by a small group that 
chooses a smaller r, and gets further in appearance from the others and reduces conspicuousness. 
A solution is likely to cover a range of values of 1r . Calculation and checking for stability in this 
case will be difficult for real functions, and will probably require numerical solutions. Any 
solution will be in the form of a density function 
P(r,θ)=C(r)/2pir , i.e. dependent on r but not θ. 
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It will satisfy the following two conditions: 
(i) the payoff to all individuals in the population must be identical 
(ii) C(r) is continuous and there will be a unique point, r( mr ), where C( mr )=0 (otherwise 
individuals could change to marginally larger r with greater payoff), giving 
 
∫=
rm
drrCN
0
)(  
 
Assuming that a=0, we expect a solution will be of the form  
 
1) D(w)Q( )(wI )=D(0)Q( )0(I ) for all w. 
 
2) C( mr )=0 
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We conjecture that there will usually be a unique solution of this type.  
 
 
 
Appendix 2: Example functions 
 
We now consider some examples of the functions described above to show the type of solutions 
which can occur. 
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Finally the information function Q is given by  
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This yields a unique value for optimal t, given by 
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This general expression works only for t> ct  (the ratio of the derivative of Q and Q is a little more 
complex for t< ct , but the principle is no different). All solutions when t< ct are unstable unless 
r=0, as mentioned earlier. 
 
In the simplifying case where λ=a=0, we obtain 
 
)0,(1 βα −= Maxt , independently of r, which works whether ctt >1   or not. 
 
 
1r  =0 is an ESS if 
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When a=0 we obtain 
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for negative 1I   (it is trivially true for positive 1I  ). This is clearly satisfied when 1I  is near 0 and 
when it is very large and negative, but possibly can be violated for intermediate values. Thus 
instability occurs in a critical range of information 1I   only, which for some parameters may be 
empty; if 1I   is large and negative then individuals are very attractive to predators and maximum 
camouflage is best, if 1I   is near zero individuals are slightly attractive to predators but cannot 
improve things much by changing appearance, so staying at r=0 is again best. For intermediate 
values individuals may be able to reduce their attractiveness by moving away from their current 
appearance, even though they will be discovered by predators more often. 1r  =0 is more likely to 
be a solution if the rate of decline of attacks as toxicity increases declines slowly, predators cannot 
identify differences between individuals for discriminatory purposes very well or camouflage is 
very effective. As long as a is not very large, the same pattern occurs for non-zero a.  
1r  >0 is an ESS if 
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This is only possible if 1I  >0. For a=0 we obtain 
 
))1((
)1(1)()(
)()()0( 1
00
1
0
1
1
/
1
11
/
/
1 r
r
edd
ed
I
rDIQ
rDIQSI
−
−
−+
−
>⇒>
κν
 
 
If further λ=0 then 
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which yields 
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so that any value of 1r   that is sufficiently large will be stable (and for some parameter values this 
will be true for all r, since R will be negative). Hence, beyond some threshold value of 
conspicuousness, any common form will be stable. 
